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ABSTRACT
We assess the role of child care in the welfare to work transition using an unusually large and
comprehensive data base. Our data are for Massachusetts, a state that began welfare reform in 1995
under a federal waiver, for the period July 1996 through August 1997. We find that both the nature
of the child care market and the availability of subsidized care and early education affect the
probability that current and former welfare recipients will work. Regarding the child care market,
we find that the cost, stability and quality of care matter. We also find that child care subsidies and
some types of early education serve to increase employment. To be more specific, we find that
increased funding for child care subsidies and the availability of full day kindergarten significantly
increase the probability the current and former welfare recipients work.
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In this paper, we consider the impacts of the child care market, child care subsidies and
early childhood education programs on the probability of employment and the hours of work of
current and former welfare recipients.  Our work builds on previous work examining the impact
of child care costs.  We extend this work in a number of ways.  First, we specifically consider the
role of child care in welfare reform.  Second, we expand the aspects of child care considered
beyond costs to include quality and availability.  Third, we consider the impacts of a broad range
of child care programs designed to care for and educate low-income children.  To be specific, we
consider the roll of child care subsidies, Head Start and early education programs.
There is a large literature showing that the cost of child care plays a major role in the
labor market decisions of women with children (e.g., see Averett, et al., 1997; Berger and Blank,
1992; Connelly, 1992; Johansen, et al., 1996; Kimmel, 1992, 1995, 1998; Myers and Heintze,
1999; and Ribar, 1992, 1995).  However, paucity of data has not allowed assessment of the
impact of other aspects of the child care market.  Child care is a heterogeneous product and, as
such, assessment of impacts requires measures of both the cost and the quality of care.  Child
care is also a location-specific good and so the availability of care in specific local areas may
impact labor market decisions.  Using previously unexploited data, we are able to consider the
impact of the price, quality and availability of child care on the labor market decisions of the
current and former welfare recipients in our sample.
It is widely believed that child care and early childhood education programs play a major
role in welfare reform.  Indeed, federal welfare reform legislation substantially revised and
expanded funding for child care subsidies at the same time that it imposed work requirements
and eliminated the entitlement to cash assistance.  Since welfare reform, most state governments
have not only expanded funding for child care subsidies but have also increased funding for early
education programs.  As far as we are aware, there is, at present, no published work that
considers simultaneously the impact of all of these varied programs.
We use a unique data set for Massachusetts, a state that began welfare reform in 1995
under a federal waiver, for the period July 1996 through August 1997 to carry out our analyses.
The data set contains information from monthly interviews on almost 14 thousand current and
former welfare recipients. We have added detailed information on the availability, price and
quality of child care for each township using resource and referral agency data. We have2
incorporated information on the availability, funding level and administration of both state and
federal child care subsidy and early education programs. We have incorporated variables to
control for other major policies (e.g., EITC, economic development), for the nature of local labor
markets and community characteristics.
To briefly preview our results, we find that, as in previous work, increases in the costs of
child care significantly decrease the probability that women with children will work.  However,
we find that the stability and quality of child care have much larger effects on the probability of
work than do costs.
Consistent with recent work, we find that increased funding for child care subsidies is
associated with increased probabilities that current and former welfare recipients will work. We
also find that current and former welfare recipients living in areas with full-day kindergartens are
more likely to work than recipients living in areas with part-day or no kindergarten.  The
availability of typically part-day, part-year Head Start and Pre-K programs is associated with a
decreased probability that the current and former recipients in our sample will work and a
concomitant increase in the probability that they will be involved in training and education,
which is more compatible with a part-day, part-year schedule.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we describe welfare reform in
Massachusetts. The two sections that follow describe our estimation techniques and the data we
use.  In Section 5, we describe our results and the final section contains our conclusions.
2.  Massachusetts’ Welfare Reform
In April of 1995, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts requested a welfare reform waiver
from the federal government.  Massachusetts’ plan included job training, a work requirement,
time limits, medical assistance, and centralization of the public assistance system.  The waiver
was granted except for time limits.  Overseen by the newly formed Department of Transitional
Assistance (replacing the Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare as of July 1, 1995), these
reforms were initiated on November 1, 1995.  In the following year, President Clinton signed the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA).  PRWORA
changed the landscape of the welfare system.  PRWORA replaced the previous AFDC program
with block grants from the federal government to the states and granted the states greater
freedom in distributing welfare funds, which became known as TANF (Temporary Assistance to3
Needy Families).  Although some restrictions were placed on who is eligible to receive monies
from the TANF block grants, states were given considerable leeway in setting up their eligibility
requirements for assistance as well as the system used to determine the level of each family’s
benefits.  Two novel components of PRWORA are work requirements and time limits.
Massachusetts met the work requirements of PRWORA, and, with its passage, the state was also
able (and now required for federal funding) to implement their previously requested time limits.
1
In Massachusetts, anyone subject to the time limit is permitted to receive TAFDC (as the
TANF program is called in Massachusetts) funds for a maximum of 24 months in any
consecutive 60 months.  Anyone subject to work requirements must, within 60 days of receiving
TAFDC funds, be actively involved in some type of work for at least 20 hours per week.  If the
person fails to find a job, she is required to perform 20 hours of community service per week.
Although there are some other exceptions (mainly for the disabled and for teenaged parents), the
Massachusetts program is straightforward.  A TAFDC recipient is exempt from the time limits
and the work requirement if her youngest child is under the age of two.  The clock on time limits
starts ticking on the youngest child’s 2
nd birthday.  The recipient remains work exempt, however,
until her youngest child is six years old.  It is important to note that these are separate
requirements.  If one receives benefits while the youngest child is two and three, thus exhausting
the time limits, the time limit deadline comes into effect and benefits are terminated even though
the recipient would otherwise remain classified as work exempt for the next two years as her
youngest child passes through the ages of four and five.
Massachusetts’ job training and education program, the Employment Services Program
(ESP), is available to all TAFDC recipients.  Participation in the ESP is voluntary if one is
exempt from the work requirement and mandatory for those not exempt; however, all recipients
are strongly encouraged to participate in the ESP.  The program includes on-the-job training, job
skill development, education, and a “structured job search” program.  The structured job search
portion of ESP, though originally state run, was completely privatized by the fall of 1998.
It is important to understand how the work requirement affects participation in the ESP.
First, as long as the adult TAFDC recipient remains work exempt, she can enter job training and
education programs paid for by the ESP.  This includes continuing a high school education,
                                                       
1 Under its waiver authority, the Commonwealth continues to operate other aspects of its TANF program,
which in some ways conflict with PRWORA.4
obtaining a GED, or even enrolling in a state-funded college for up to two years.  Second, the
education programs of the ESP are available to all TAFDC clients.  However, clients subject to
the work requirement must be working at least 20 hours a week within 60 days of receiving
assistance.  This means that any educational or training programs offered by the ESP must be
attended in addition to working.  Pursuing schooling (unlike job training or on-the-job training,
which are less time intensive), therefore, becomes more difficult once the individual becomes
subjected to the work requirement.
In addition to offering the ESP, the Department of Transitional Assistance also offers
“state-standard” child care to anyone who is receiving TAFDC monies and is in need of child
care; for example, to those employed, in school, actively seeking employment, or in job training.
Upon the DTA’s authorization, the recipient receives a child care voucher that can be used to
purchase either formal or informal child care.  The vouchers are subject to a sliding-fee co-
payment that depends on income needs, family size, and the amount of child care used.
Under the Massachusetts system, anyone receiving TAFDC assistance automatically is
eligible to receive Medicaid (and vice versa).  The DTA also has worked closely with the
regional transportation authorities to offer subsidized public transportation to TAFDC recipients.
In addition to subsidizing travel on existing public transportation, the DTA oversaw the re-
routing of buses (and the starting of new routes) and the implementation of shuttle systems.
When a TAFDC recipient’s case is closed due to exhaustion of her time limit or
employment, she remains eligible to receive temporary medical assistance, (possibly) food
stamps, transitional child care, transportation subsidies, and access to the structured job search
program for at least one year.  After one year of being off the TAFDC rolls, the above-mentioned
programs are made available to previous TAFDC clients on an “income-eligible” basis.
3.  Empirical Strategy and Estimation
Two questions are addressed in this paper.  First, what factors matter in determining
whether a welfare recipient works versus participates in training/education programs via the
Massachusetts Employment Services Program?  Second, what factors matter in determining how
many hours are worked each week by those recipients who work?  These questions are framed in
light of the time limits that were imposed on December 1, 1996.  Clearly the regulations promote
training and education for those with children under two years old, as these recipients are exempt5
from time limits and the work requirement.  At the opposite end of the spectrum, it is a “work
first” regulation for those with children over five years old, as these recipients are subject to time
limits and the work requirement.  In between the two extremes the regulations are mixed, i.e.,
recipients with children between two and five years old are subject to time limits, yet they are
work exempt allowing them to pursue training / education if they so choose (a possibly riskier
proposition since they will not receive public assistance monies after two years of support).
  In addition to investigating the effects of the new welfare regulations, we also study
how the child care market enters into the decisions of households.  In particular we take into
account the availability, cost, and quality of formal child care as well as some features of
informal child care via friends and family and the state child care voucher system.  We further
include variables reflecting the availability of Early Childhood Education Programs (ECEs) such
as Head Start, full-day kindergarten, and public grants targeted to caring for disadvantaged three
and four year old children.
Our data is described in the next section.  For clarity, however, it is useful to understand
the sample of individuals for whom we have information. Ultimately we will have a longitudinal
data set of almost 14,000 households and over 81,000 monthly observations.  The data come
from the child care voucher monthly billing records and the Department of Transitional
Assistance’s monthly interviews of social service recipients in Massachusetts.  As the data come
from both of these sources and are merged using family identifiers, our sample is of current child
care voucher recipients who are also current or former TANF recipients.  Thus, our results apply
directly to this group of people.  In particular, to be observed in our data set, the adult child care
voucher recipient must be doing something “worthwhile” with her time from the Department of
Transitional Assistance’s point of view - working, job training, education, or job search - in
order to be currently receiving a child care voucher.
We offer two empirical models.  First, because our data is limited to current and former
TANF recipients who also receive child care vouchers, we consider a reduced form model of the
probability of working vs. job training/education.  Second, for those working, we consider a
reduced form model of the weekly hours worked.  We model working and hours worked as
dependent on: human-capital/socio-demographic characteristics of the individual (H),
characteristics of the formal market for child care (CC), policy and administrative variables
related to the Massachusetts child care voucher system (VS), characteristics of ECEs (EE), other6
public policy variables (PP), the costs of working (CW), local labor market conditions (LM), and
a community-specific fixed effect (FE).  Respectively, the two models can be written as:
(1)  Prob. of Work = Probit( b1H + a1CC + g1VS + f1EE + d1PP + x1CW + k1LM + FE1 + e1)
and, conditional on working,
(2)  Hours Worked = b2H + a2CC + g2VS + f2EE + d2PP + x2CW + k2LM + FE2 + e2.
As we observe households over time, the estimation of equations (1) and (2) must reflect
unobserved family-specific attributes that may affect the unbiasedness and consistency of the
estimation.
2  The most commonly used estimators for models using longitudinal data are the
fixed-effects and random-effects estimators.  The fixed-effects estimator requires that the
unobservable family-specific effect be constant over time.  Though it requires few other
assumptions, the fixed-effects estimator relies only on deviations from family-specific means to
estimate the parameters, and thus is not efficient as it ignores time-invariant information (such as
race) as well as the initial values of time-variant information.  On the other hand, random-effects
estimation utilizes all of the time-invariant information in the data and is therefore more
efficient.  Generalizing the results from random-effects estimation also rests of firmer ground
than generalizing results from fixed-effects estimation as family-specific effects are assumed to
have a distribution (that is estimated) not fixed and, thus, unique to the particular sample utilized.
However, the unbiasedness of the random-effects estimator requires that the explanatory
variables be uncorrelated with the family specific random-effect.
  The traditional random-effects estimator has also been criticized, because it imposes a
constant correlation across all time periods on the unmeasured, family-specific effect.  This is
equivalent to requiring that unmeasured family-specific behavioral patterns have a constant
correlation across all time periods.  However, most behavioral models suggest that the degree to
which behaviors are correlated declines with time.  Liang and Zeger (1986) and Liang, Zeger,
                                                       
2 This is a well-known problem.  See Chamberlain (1984), Greene (1997), and Liang and Zeger (1986) for
more detailed discussions of the econometric issues and the techniques employed here to estimate our
models using longitudinal data.7
and Qaqish (1992) provide for an unstructured random-effects estimator that is free from the
restrictive assumption of the traditional random-effects model.  To discern the robustness of our
results, we estimate equations (1) and (2) using a traditional random-effects estimator, a
generalized random-effects estimator that imposes no structure on the correlation of the family-
specific random-effects over time, and a fixed-effects estimator.
3
Two final points on estimation are warranted.  First, our longitudinal data incorporates
unbalanced panels as households are observed for varying lengths of time as they enter and leave
the child care voucher program.  Thus, we calculate robust standard errors to adjust for the
heteroskedasticity imparted by the unbalanced panels of households.  Second, to improve the
efficiency of our estimates, we reduce our specification to the set of variables by iteratively
eliminating variables with t statistics less than 1 in absolute value and that are jointly
insignificant with related variables.  This is a widely used model selection criterion as
emphasized in Leamer (1983).
4.  Data
Our primary data come from two Massachusetts state agencies.  The Office of Child Care
Services (OCCS) provides monthly information on the use of child care vouchers of current and
former TAFDC recipients, and the Department of Transitional Assistance (DTA) provides
information from the monthly re-determination interviews of social services recipients and for
those enrolled in the Employment Services Program.  Sequentially assigned family identifiers
allow this information to be merged to form a longitudinal data set containing 14 months of
data.
4
                                                       
3 To be specific, for the underlying model Yit = Xitb + ai + eit, the fixed-effects estimator minimizes the
criterion function: |y-xb|¢ Var(y) |y-xb| where y and x are deviations from family-specific means and
Var(y) is a diagonal matrix with element i equal to Var(eit-ei).  Similarly, the random-effects estimators
minimize the criterion function: |Y-Xb|¢ Var(Y) |Y-Xb| where Var(Y) is a block diagonal matrix with
symmetric, family-specific Ti x Ti matrices on the diagonal.  For the traditional random-effects estimator,
each of these Ti x Ti matrices has constant covariance parameters (Cov(ait,a it¢)=r for all t„t¢) off the
diagonal and Var(ai+eit) on the diagonal.  The unstructured random-effects estimator does not require the
off-diagonal covariance parameters to be the same.  Rather, as suggested by many behavioral models, it
allows Cov(ait,ait¢) to vary as the length of time between time periods t and t¢ increases.
4 All information that would allow for any family to be identified (e.g., social security numbers) were
eliminated from the data files.  Merges were carried out using a sequentially assigned identifier.8
 We add to this core data set other information that varies either by geographic region or
time or both in order to capture local labor market conditions, welfare assistance policies,
economic factors, and child care programs/costs.  These data are then used to model the labor
market outcomes of current and former TAFDC recipients.  While not perfect, we believe these
data more effectively capture local labor and child care markets than many previous studies.  We
describe our data (and sources) below.  The summary statistics are given according to the unit of
observation, e.g., individual, township, zip code, etc.  Table A1, following the paper, gives a
complete summary of the definitions and sources while Table A2 gives the summary statistics
for our final data set of 81,397 monthly snap-shots of current and former TAFDC recipients.
Individual Data
Our individual data are available for 14 months, July 1996 through August 1997.  The
DTA intake interview gives us information on several non-changing characteristics of the
recipient.  Table 1A summarizes this information.  The voucher recipients tend to be English
speaking, single females who have a high school degree or GED but did not have access to
health insurance at the time of applying for assistance.  A particularly attractive feature of the
data is its racial diversity, with Blacks and Hispanics each compromising over 30 percent of the
sample.
For as long as the voucher recipient continues to receive public assistance or is enrolled
in the Employment Services Program, monthly observations regarding the recipient’s labor
Table 1A. Characteristics of Adult Child Care Voucher Recipients (N=13,823).
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market activities are observed from the monthly re-evaluation interviews.  Merging this
information across sources gives us information on 13,823 families that are current or former
TAFDC recipients and current child care voucher recipients.  From July 96 through August 97
we have 81,397 monthly “snap-shots” of these families, 75 percent of whom we observe for at
least 6 of the possible 14 months.
 Table 1B summarizes these monthly snap-shots. Voucher recipients tend to be around
the age of 27, have 2 dependents - the youngest of which is 3 years old.  OCCS relies on several
Child Care Resource Agencies (CCRAs) to help administer the child care voucher program and
to provide child care information and referral services.  In our sample, the two CCRAs with the
most recipients are Child Care Choices of Boston and the PET/New England Farm Workers
Council (Springfield and surrounding areas of Hampden County).  In just over 60 percent of the
monthly interviews, recipients indicate having worked last week.  For those working, the median
hours worked was 35 hours per week.  Finally, most recipients use full-day child care vouchers
for center care, are subject to no co-payment, and use their voucher for about 21 days of child
care each month.
Table 1B. Characteristics of Adult Child Care Voucher Recipients (N=81,397).
Mean Median Min Max
Age
Number of Dependents
Age of Youngest Child
Youngest Child is less than 2-Years Old
Youngest Child is 2 to 5 Years Old
Youngest Child is 6 to 13 Years Old
Child Care Resource Agency
          Child Care Choices of Boston
          Child Care Resource Center
          Child Care Search
          Child Care Works
          New England Farm Workers Council
Worked Last Week
Hours Worked if Working (N=49,131)
Receives Voucher for Full-day Care
Uses Voucher for Center Care
Days of Child Care Service Used last Month






































































 Information on the availability, costs, and quality of child care comes from the 1997
Resource and Referral databases and the 1996 state child care licensing list.  The data are
aggregated over providers to the township level and do not vary over time.  Data are available
separately for family care (in-home care) and group child care (center care).  Further, data for the
group care is available for infants, toddlers, pre-kindergarten, and school age children separately.
We approximate the availability of care as the number of slots available per 100 children
- for family care, this is taken over the population of kids 0 to 11 years old, whereas for the
group care, this is taken over the population of 0 to 1 year olds for infants, 2 to 3 year olds for
toddlers, 4 to 5 year olds for preschool and 6 to 11 years old for after school programs.
5  Quality
of care is captured by the percent of group care centers that are accredited by the National
Association for the Education of Young Children (NAEYC).  Stability in the market for formal
care is proxied by the average days providers have been in operation.  Finally, child care costs
are measured by the average weekly price for each type of group care in the town of residence.
6
For the weekly costs and days in service, we also consider the inter-quartile range (IQR) to
capture the variation in costs and quality across child care centers within one’s town.
Table 2 gives the summary statistics with townships providing the unit of observation.  In
our empirical analysis, we assign the age-specific value of the group care variables to each of our
voucher recipients.  That is, households with a newborn are associated with the value of infant
availability, cost, and quality.  See Table A2 for the summary statistics of these variables when
they are assigned to each voucher recipient on a monthly basis.
Table 2.  Mean Township Child Care Market Variables (N=144).
Family Care Group Care
All Ages Infant Toddler Preschool After School
Capacity per 100 Kids in
Age Group 6.4 2.2 5.1 31.6 5.5
Median Days in Service 1679 2840 3802 4711 4507
IQR Days in Service 1882 2579 3254 4716 4094
Percent NAEYC Accredited Na 0.125 0.123 0.121 0.071
Median Weekly Cost Na 151 146 139 139
IQR Weekly Cost Na 37 32 32 35
                                                       
5 This is the most commonly used measure of availability of child care.  For a discussion, see Queralt and
Witte (1998a, 1998b).
6 Most families have formal child care providers in their neighborhood (Queralt and Witte, 1998a).11
Funding for the Massachusetts child care voucher system and federal and state public
assistance monies are, at times, allocated on the basis of a formula that includes the local
TAFDC caseload, the child poverty rate, and child neglect rates.  To capture the effect of these
formulas, they are included in the analysis as well.
  The state’s regional daily reimbursement rate for child care also affects the availability
and quality of subsidized care.  The reimbursement rates are, in effect, a price ceiling on care that
providers can charge and expect to receive in total from the state plus the family’s co-payment.
7
Table 3 provides the summary statistics for these variables.
Table 3.  Policy & Administrative Variables Related to the Child Care Voucher System.
1997 Township Values (N=144) Mean Median Min Max
State & federal child care subsidies per poor child
AFDC Caseload per 1,000 Persons
Proportion Children below 185% Poverty Level
1996 Child Neglect/Abuse Cases per 1,000 Kids





















1996-97 Average Zip Code Values (N=244)
Median State Daily Reimbursement Rate










We incorporate information on the three major early education programs in
Massachusetts - Head Start, Community Partnerships for Children (funded by the state), and
publicly provided pre-kindergarten and kindergarten programs.
Head Start
8 is a federally funded, locally administered program aimed at economically
disadvantaged children.  Head Start began as part of the war on poverty to serve disadvantaged 4
and 5 year olds on a part-day, part-year basis.  Recently the program has been expanded in some
areas to also serve 0 to 3 year olds.  We have collected the data from the 1996-97 and 1997-98
Program Information Reports filed by the roughly 30 Head Start delegate agencies in
                                                       
7 For all population estimates, we start with the 1990 census that reports population numbers at the
township and zip code level and by age group (under 1 year old, 1 to 2 years old, 3 to 4 years old, etc.).
Populations spanning more than one age are split equally among the ages.  We use these numbers to
estimate the 1989 proportion of kids in any age group.  We then use a 1997 estimate of the total
population by township provided by the Census bureau.  We use the proportions designated in the 1990
Census to extrapolate the 1997 township populations by age group.  Our estimates of populations by age
group by zip code come from Geolytics (1999).
8 The state of Massachusetts supplements federal funding for Head Start with state dollars.12
Massachusetts.  Our analysis takes into account if there is a Head Start program operating in the
township of the household and, if so, what type of agency runs the program (i.e., a Community
Action Agency (anti-poverty agency) or another type of agency such as a public school or non-
profit organization). Using information on when the Head Start programs are in operation, we
determine if the household’s youngest child is “Head Start Eligible”.  To be Head Start eligible
there must be a local Head Start program, it must be currently in operation (not on winter or
summer break), and it must serve the age group of the household’s youngest child.
9
Starting in the early 1990s, the Massachusetts Department of Education invited grant
applications from private organizations, public schools, charities, and others to help care for,
educate, stimulate, and protect poor three and four year old children.  Each grant recipient (no
more than one per township) is called a Community Partnership for Children (CPC).  In fiscal
year 1993, 172 townships received $13 million through 89 different CPCs.  Over the years, the
monies have been renewed annually (and frequently increased) and more CPCs have been
funded.  By fiscal year 1998, 229 townships received almost $60 million through 157 different
CPCs.  We include in our analysis the township’s annual CPC budget per three and four year old
children living in households earning less than 185% of the federal poverty level.
10
Finally, the Massachusetts Department of Education provided information on which
school districts offer free, full-day kindergarten, each school district’s enrollment in pre-
kindergarten and kindergarten programs, and each school district’s age requirement for starting
kindergarten for the 1996-97 school year.  From these data, we determine the pre-kindergarten,
kindergarten, and (elementary) school eligibility of the youngest child in the household.  As
before, eligibility requires that the youngest child be of the acceptable age for the program and
that the program be in operation during the month.  We also calculate the percent of four year
olds in publicly provided pre-kindergarten programs and the percent of five year olds in publicly
provided kindergarten programs.  Summary statistics for all of the early childhood education
program variables are given in Table 4.
                                                       
9 Recall that all families in our sample qualify for child care subsidies and so most would be economically
eligible for Head Start.
10 From the Department of Education, we know the percent of students living in households that earn less
than 185 percent of the federal poverty level (which corresponds to being eligible to receive reduce priced
or free lunch) in each school district.  This FPL cutoff level is our definition of “poor” throughout the
paper and is used to approximate the percent of poor kids at all age levels.13
Table 4.  Early Childhood Education Programs.
1996-97 Head Start by Township (N=144) Mean Median Min Max
Head Start in Township
     If Head Start, run by Community Action Agency













Community Partnership for Children by Township
Fiscal Year 1997 Dollars per Poor Child (N=143)









1996-97 School District Variables (N=137)
Offers Full-day Kindergarten
Proportion of 4 Year Olds in Pre-Kindergarten


































Other Policy and Administrative Variables
During the time period of our study, the federal government funded an empowerment
zone in Boston and enhanced community projects in Lowell and Springfield.  These programs
target specific Census tracts.  A close mapping from Census tract to zip code allows us to
determine which households live in these zones.  In addition, the Massachusetts Office of
Business Development (MOBD) provided tax breaks and other economic incentives and
resources on 439 "Certified Projects" throughout the state.  Each of these projects is associated
with a specific dollar amount to be spent on economic revitalization within a township.  We
include in the analysis the local total budget of these certified projects per person.  As the month
that the certified project began is known, this series changes monthly.  We also control for
whether or not standard operations at the local welfare office consolidate responsibilities across
case workers.  Table 5 reports the summary statistics for these variables.
Table 5.  Other Policy & Administrative Variables.
Township Variation (N=144) Mean Median Min Max
Welfare Office is Consolidated (N=144) .813 1 0 1
Monthly Variation in Township (N=1523)
EDIP Dollars per Worker 226 0 0 8863
Zip Code Variation (N=244)
Federal Empowerment Zone/Enhanced Community .070 0 0 114
Costs of Working
To control for the general costs of working, we turn to the 1990 Census.  We use the 1-
year and 5-year inter-zip code moving rate and the 5-year inter-county moving rate to control for
the family’s access to informal child care via friends and family. We also include the average
commute time and the proportion of workers using public transportation.  Finally, at the MSA
level, we turn to the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Occupational Wage Survey (OWS) to include
the median child care worker wage and to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development for the 40
th percentile of the fair market rent for a 2 bedroom apartment.
11  The
summary statistics are given in Table 6.
Table 6.  Costs of Working.
1990 Census by Zip Code (N=244) Mean Median Min Max
1 Year Household Zip Code Turnover Rate
5 Year Household Zip Code Turnover Rate
5 Year Household County Turnover Rate
Average Commute to Work in Minutes
Public Transportation is Available


























1997 Median Child Care Worker Wage
1996 Fair Market Rate for a 2 Bedroom Apt. (HUD)













Local Labor Market Conditions
The labor market conditions that we account for include each township’s monthly
employment growth rate (BLS’s Local Area Unemployment Statistics), the percent of local jobs
that are in the service and trade sector as indicated by ES 202 data,
12 the median retail sales and
cashiers wage in the MSA (OWS), the proportion of workers leaving for work between 4 pm and
midnight (1990 Census by zip code),
13 and whether or not the township has a Massachusetts
Division of Employment and Training Job Center.  The summary statistics for the local labor
market conditions are given in Table 7.
                                                       
11 Seven of our 144 townships are not in an MSA.  The clients in these 7 towns (which account for only
283 of our 81,397 monthly observations) are assigned to the closest MSA.
12 Most women of the type in our sample are employed in the services and trade sectors.  See Witte,
Queralt, and Griesinger (1998) for a discussion.15
Table 7.  Local Labor Market Conditions.
Township Variation (N=144) Mean Median Min Max
Div. of Employ. & Training Job Center
Service Jobs per Worker (ES202 data)













Monthly Variation in Township (N=1523)
Employment Growth Rates x 100 -.001 .003 -.349 .273
Zip Code Variation (N=244)
Prop. Workers Leave for Work b/w 4pm & midnight .061 .060 0 .126
MSA Characteristics (N=11)
1997 Median Retail Sales Wage










Finally, we also control for several community characteristics measured at the zip code
level.  Using estimates of 1998 characteristics by zip code (Geolytics, 1999), we include median
household income, proportion Black, and proportion Hispanic.  Using the 1990 Census directly
we include the proportion of zip code residents who were born in a foreign country.  Finally,
using yearly data provided by the Massachusetts Department of State Police, we incorporate the
number of arrests for drug crimes and Part I criminal offenses per 100,000 people and the
proportion of Part I criminal offenses cleared with an arrest by township.
14  The summary
statistics for the community characteristics are given in Table 8.
Table 8.  Community Characteristics.
















1990 Census Data by Zip Code (N=244)
Proportion Foreign Born .100 .024 0 .670
Yearly Variation by Township (N=260)
Drug Crimes per 100,000 People
Part I Criminal Offenses per 100,000 People













                                                                                                                                                                                  
13 Child care is much less available at these time.
14 Caring for children in neighborhoods with high crime rates is both more time consuming and more
expensive.16
5.  Results
In this section we present and discuss the results for the probability of working, equation
(1), and the weekly hours worked, equation (2), from section 3.  Tables A4 and A5 contain
estimation results for the probability of working and the weekly hours worked respectively.  To
assess the robustness of results, these tables contain the estimated coefficients for a traditional
random-effects model (i.e., time-constant or structured covariance matrix for the unobserved
individual effect), a flexible random-effects model (i.e., a time-varying or unstructured
covariance matrix for the unobserved individual effect), and a fixed-effects model.  The results
are also given for the full specification and a reduced specification.  The reduced specification
drops variables that produce t-statistics of less than 1 in absolute value.  This process is repeated
until all variables remaining satisfy the t-statistic criterion.  Exceptions are granted for policy and
regulation variables of great interest that do not jointly satisfy this criterion.
15 On the surface, for
example, whether the mother is Black should be dropped from the reduced specification for
hours worked.  Jointly testing that “Black”, “Hispanic”, and “Other Race” are all jointly
statistically insignificant, however, is rejected, and therefore whether the mother is Black is
retained in the specification.
5.1  Working vs. Training
For our sample of child voucher recipients, recall that the alternative to working is to be
enrolled in some type of job training or education program.  The probit estimates reported in
Table A4 are point estimates, thus the sign and statistical significance of each is of interest.  In
order to make the magnitude of the predicted effects clear, Table 9 (page 18) reports the
difference in estimated effects under 14 different scenarios for five general areas of interest -
Child Care Market Effects, Early Childhood Education Effects, Regulatory Effects, Personal
Effects, and Community Effects.  Each of these will be discussed in turn.  The top of Table 9
presents the “base case” household for the simulations.  For many variables, this household is
assigned the median values from the sample.  When a variable’s values enter the specification
via several indicator variables, however, the base case is associated with a particular value.  For
example, the base case is for a single, Black, female living in the Roxbury neighborhood of17
Boston.  Note also that Table 9 reports the estimated effects from the reduced specifications.
The following discussion of the predicted effects focuses on the reduced model using the
unstructured random-effects estimator.
16
Child Care Market Effects
Scenario 1 shows the predicted effect from increased federal and state funding of child
care vouchers.  Spending on child care vouchers in Massachusetts increased from $434 per poor
child in fiscal year 1996 to $511 in fiscal year 1997.  The predicted effect from this increase in
voucher spending increases the probability of working by 3.6%.  These results are similar to
results obtained using data for Miami-Dade County, Florida (Queralt, Witte and Griesinger,
1999).
 In scenario 2, we see that increasing the median weekly cost of child care from $90 to
$180 (approximately the 5
th percentile to the 95
th percentile) reduces the probability of working
by 4.5%.
The third and fourth scenarios concern the quality of child care and are quite revealing
about the institutional structure of the child care market and the transition from welfare to work.
Scenario 3 shows that increasing the median time in operation for family child care providers
from 3 to 6 years increases the probability of working by 11.1%.  The fixed-effects model
suggests the increase is over 40%, which seems unreasonably high to us.  Increasing the quality
of care (as measured by accreditation) also significantly increases the probability that a welfare
recipient works, but the effect is much smaller than the effect of greater stability of family child
care providers.  To be more specific, increasing the number of NAEYC accredited group child
care centers from 10% to 50% increases the probability of working by at most a couple of
percentage points.  Thus, quality matters when quality means having a well-developed and stable
child care market.  The effect from having more centers being nationally accredited, however,
appears to play a significant but much smaller roll.
                                                                                                                                                                                  
15 The first few rounds of eliminating variables removed only those townships, welfare offices, Boston
neighborhoods, and SMSAs that failed the criterion. Once the model was reduced in this dimension, then
the policy and socio-demographic variables were considered for removal.
16 The correlation matrix strongly supports using the time-varying correlation matrix in place of the time-
invariant matrix assumed by the traditional random-effects estimator.18
Table 9.  Predicted Effects on the Probability of Working and from Reduced Regressions.
Base Case (BC): The client is female, Black, non-Hispanic, single, and 27 years old.  She has a high
school degree, two dependents, and no private insurance.  Her youngest child is 3 years old and is not
age-eligible for Head Start. She lives in Boston in the Roxbury neighborhood using the (non-
consolidated) Bowdoin Park welfare office.  There is no DET job center in her neighborhood.  Her
administering agency is Child Care Choices of Boston.  She does not live in the Boston empowerment
zone.  A non-CAA Head Start program will be available when her children are older as will full-day
kindergarten.  Effects are calculated following the imposition of time limits on December 1, 1996.  All
other values are taken at the median.





Child Care Market Effects
New: BC with 1997 child care subsidy of $511 per poor 0.028 0.036 0.040 1.
Old: BC with 1996 state & federal child care subsidy of (0.0001) (0.0011) (0.0025)
New: BC with weekly median cost of care at $180. -0.045 -0.060 2.
Old: BC with median weekly cost of care at $90. (0.0262) (0.0021)
New: BC with median family care centers in operation 6 0.149 0.111 0.417 3.
Old: BC with median family care centers in operation 3 (0.0002) (0.0129) (0.0013)
New: BC with 50% of group centers NAEYC accredited. 0.011 0.018 0.025 4.
Old: BC with 10% of group centers NAEYC accredited. (0.0057) (0.0089) (0.0013)
Early Childhood Education Effects
New: BC. 0.074 0.032 5.
Old: BC with no full-day kindergarten. (0.0181) (0.0212)
New: BC with 95% of 5 year olds in kindergarten. -0.031 -0.026 6.
Old: BC with 70% of 5 year olds in kindergarten. (0.0252) (0.0188)
New: BC with 35% of 4 year olds in pre-kindergarten. -0.0299 -0.045 -0.090 7.
Old: BC with 10% of 4 year olds in pre-kindergarten. (0.0139) (0.0128) (0.0048)
New: BC. -0.0139 -0.031 -0.022 8.
Old: BC with no Head Start program in the town. (0.0034) (0.0053) (0.0014)
Regulatory Effects
New: BC with youngest child being an infant. -0.046 -0.082 -0.039 9.
Old: BC. (0.0051) (0.0066) (0.0026)
Personal Effects
New: BC with mother 37 years old. 0.082 0.114 0.009 10
. Old: BC with mother 22 years old. (0.0134) (0.0110) (0.0276)
New: BC with mother having no high school degree. -0.059 -0.087 11
. Old: BC. (0.0056) (0.0075)
New: BC with White mother. -0.0239 -0.035 12
. Old: BC (with Black mother). (0.0058) (0.0087)
Community Effects
New: BC with 35% of workers using public -0.124 -0.024 -0.288 13
. Old: BC with 10% of workers using public (0.043) (0.0214) (0.0126)
New: BC with police clearing 40% of crimes with arrest. 0.027 0.027 0.076 14
. Old: BC with police clearing 10% of crimes with arrest. (0.0136) (0.0159) (0.0022)
Note: The standard error of the difference in predictions is in parentheses.19
Early Childhood Education Effects
Scenario 5 shows that the probability of working is higher by 3.2% in townships that
offer full-day kindergarten programs.  Scenarios 6 and 7 show the effect of having generally high
enrollment rates in kindergarten and pre-kindergarten programs.  Whereas full-day kindergarten
programs are more conducive to working full-time, the results suggest that part-day kindergarten
(76% of all kindergarten programs), Pre-K, and Head Start programs are more conducive to
continuing education, which is easier to do on a part-time basis.  As seen in scenarios 6 and 7,
increasing the proportion of five year olds in kindergarten from 70% to 95% or increasing the
proportion of four year olds in pre-kindergarten from 10% to 35% reduces the probability of
working by 2.6% and 4.5% respectively.  The 8
th scenario similarly shows that the presence of a
Head Start program is associated with a 3.1% lower chance of working.
Regulatory Effects
Given how the time limits and work requirement rules in Massachusetts focus almost
exclusively on the age of the youngest child, we have a strong interest in knowing how these
rules affect behavior.  Scenario 9 shows, as one would expect, the strong behavioral response to
working (versus training) when one’s youngest child is under the age of two compared to when
the child is two to five years old.  Having a child under the age of two (as compared to having a
3 year old) increases the probability of choosing more education or job training by as much as
8.2%.  This is exactly as one would expect as time limits are imposed beginning on the child’s
second birthday.  A similar behavioral response is expected between the ages of five and six, the
threshold age for the work requirement.  The coefficient on “youngest child is 2 to 5 years old”
indicator variable, though consistently negative, is repeatedly insignificant in Table 4A.  The
expected effects from this age-threshold legislation, however, may be coming through
elementary school eligibility.  In particular, Table A4 associates a (usually statistically
significant) positive effect on the probability of working from having one’s youngest child
elementary school eligible.  Thus, regardless of time limits, the probability of working increases
when the work requirement affects the choice set of the household.
Finally, it should be noted that, economically, there was no discernable effect from the
imposition of the time limits and work requirements on December 1, 1996.  This may be because
the behavioral response from the regulation comes entirely though the age of the mother's20
youngest child.  It is also possible that welfare recipients were aware of the changes that were
going to be made in the rules (the rule changes were announced in September of 1996 and
discussed in welfare office visits), and changed their behavior to account for the new regulations
prior to the official December 1, 1996 effective date of the legislation.
Personal Effects
The predicted effects from changes in personal characteristics are quite substantial.
Scenario 10 points to the probability of working increasing with age.  A 37 year-old mother has
an 11.4% greater chance of working than a 22 year-old mother.  Similarly, the probability of
working is about 9% lower if one does not have a high school diploma.  Both of these results
probably stem from mothers without a high school degree being more willing to pursue a GED
the younger they are.  Finally, White mothers have a 3.5% greater chance of pursuing job
training or education than Black mothers.
17
Community Characteristics
Lastly we consider the major community effects, of which there are two.  First, an
increase in the proportion of workers using public transportation, from 10% to 35%, is associated
with a decline in the probability of working by 2.4%. There are many possible interpretations of
this result.  The Boston metropolitan area has a far more extensive and widely used public
transportation system than the rest of the state (particularly rural areas in the western part of the
state).  The Boston area also has a much more extensive job training and education system than
the rest of the state.  Thus the result may simply reflect this greater availability of training and
education.  Finally, the probability of working increases by roughly 2.7% when the local police
clear 40% of crimes with an arrest compared to when the clearing rate is only 10% - possibly
indicating that single mothers are more willing to leave their children and venture off to work in
safer communities.
                                                       
17 There is no economical or statistical difference between the work vs. training decision of Blacks and
Hispanics.21
5.2 Weekly Hours Worked
We now discuss the results for hours worked.  Although the point estimates are now
easily interpretable, we again focus attention on Table 10 (page 22), which is identical in
interpretation to Table 9.  The reader may use Table A5 to examine other results.
Child Care Market Effects
Scenarios 1 through 3 in Table 10 have similar implications.  Whether state and federal
child care subsidies or the quality of child care increases, the economic effect on weekly hours
worked is small (despite statistical significance).  In general the noted variables are all positively
related to hours worked but the typical differences in the values of the variables observed in the
data have less than a single hour effect per week.
The fourth scenario provides insight into the role of state imposed price ceilings on child
care.  When the reimbursement rate is changed from $20 per day (roughly the 10
th percentile) to
$30 per day (roughly the 90
th percentile), hours worked falls as much as 6 hours per week.  Thus,
the higher co-payment effect seems primarily concentrated on decreasing hours of care, not
necessarily lowing the quality of care.
Early Childhood Education Effects
The only early childhood education variables that are consistently statistically significant
are the proportion of five year olds in kindergarten and the proportion of five year olds in pre-
kindergarten.  Only the proportion of children in kindergarten, however, is practically important.
Hours worked increases by as much as nine hours a week when kindergarten enrollment covers
95% of five year olds compared to when only 70% of five year olds are in kindergarten.
18  The
presence of Head Start programs and pre-kindergarten programs, however, have no significant
effect on weekly hours worked.  This is unexpected as, intuitively, hours worked should depend
greatly on the age (and activities) of the children (and in particular the youngest child) of the
household.  Scenario 6, however, shows positive correlation between hours worked and having
one’s youngest child in elementary school.  Again, the effect is somewhat small, translating into
less than an additional 15 minutes of work per week.
                                                       
18 All 3 econometric specifications indicate a positive relationship.  For the stated scenario, however, the
predicted increase in weekly hours worked ranges from a low of 30 minutes to a high of nine hours.22
Table 10.  Predicted Effects on Hours Worked from Reduced Regressions.
Base Case (BC): The client is female, Black, non-Hispanic, single, and 27 years old.  She has a high
school degree, two dependents, and no private insurance.  Her youngest child is 3 years old and is not
age-eligible for Head Start. She lives in Boston in the Roxbury neighborhood using the (non-
consolidated) Bowdoin Park welfare office.  There is no DET job center in her neighborhood.  Here
administering agency is Child Care Centers of Boston.  She does not live in the Boston empowerment
zone.  A non-CAA Head Start program will be available when her children are older as will full-day
kindergarten.  Effects are calculated following the imposition of time limits on December 1, 1996.  All
other values are taken at the median.





Child Care Market Effects
New: BC with 1997 child care subsidy of $511 per poor 0.405 0.265 0.243 1.
Old: BC with 1996 state & federal child care subsidy of (0.0856) (0.0779) (0.0857)
New: BC with median family and group centers in 0.976 0.718 3.426 2.
Old: BC with median family and group centers in (0.7098) (0.8046) (0.8073)
New: BC with 50% of group centers NAEYC accredited. 0.437 0.519 3.
Old: BC with 10% of group centers NAEYC accredited. (0.3207) (0.2013)
New: BC with state daily reimbursement rate of $30.00. -1.195 -6.071 4.
Old: BC with state daily reimbursement rate of $20.00. (0.7595) (0.7613)
Early Childhood Education Effects
New: BC with 95% of 5 year olds in kindergarten. 2.844 0.478 8.790 5.
Old: BC with 70% of 5 year olds in kindergarten. (0.7210) (0.3730) (0.8262)
New: BC with 7 year old, elementary school eligible. 0.1886 0.237 0.233 6.
Old: BC with 7 year old, not elementary school eligible. (0.1398) (0.1415) (0.1281)
Regulatory Effects
New: BC with youngest child being an infant. -0.215 -0.327 -0.035 7.
Old: BC. (0.1934) (0.1675) (0.1636)
Personal Effects
New: BC with mother 37 years old. 1.435 1.424 -1.042 8.
Old: BC with mother 22 years old. (0.2382) (0.2345) (1.1500)
New: BC with mother having no high school degree. -0.344 -0.389 9.
Old: BC. (0.2018) (0.20431)
New: BC with Hispanic mother. -0.875 -0.763 10
. Old: BC (with Black mother). (0.2912) (0.2799)
Community Effects
New: BC with 30% yearly household moving rate. 6.680 2.415 13.142 11
. Old: BC with 10% yearly household moving rate. (1.3778) (0.5710) (1.2257)
New: BC with median retail hourly wage of $7.75. 13.830 9.0934 17.687 12
. Old: BC with median retail hourly wage of $6.00. (2.6724) (4.7635) (9.7026)
Note: The standard error of the difference in predictions is in parentheses.23
Regulatory Effects
The ex ante regulatory effects of hours worked are arguably unclear.  Mothers with
infants are not subject to time limits or work requirements, and thus do not otherwise need to be
working to collect benefits.  Thus, these mothers may tend to work less as they do not need to
work to receive public assistance.  On the other hand, as these mothers have chosen to work, they
may work as much as mothers with older children.  Moreover, although younger recipients are
more likely to pursue training in place of working, for those who actually work, obtaining
training on the side may be quite difficult as this would keep them away from their children even
more.  Thus, it is possible that mothers with older children have greater flexibility to tradeoff a
few hours of work every week to pursue training.  Scenario 7 shows a slight tendency for
mothers with younger children to work less each week, but the effect is less than 20 minutes a
week.
Personal Effects
As expected, Scenario 8 in Table 10 shows that older mothers tend to work more hours.
A 37 year old works, on average, just short of one and a half more hours a week than a 22 year
old. Further, those with high school degrees work roughly one-third of an hour more each week
than those without a high school degree.  And Hispanics work almost a full hour less each week
compared to Blacks or Whites.
Community Characteristics
Of all of the predicted effects reported in Table 10, none are as striking as the community
characteristics.  Scenario 11 points to the significant role played by moving rates.  Hours worked
each week are almost 7 hours higher in zip codes with a 30% annual moving rate (approximately
the 95
th percentile) compared to zip codes with a 10% annual moving rate (approximately the 5
th
percentile).  One interpretation of this finding is that people are moving for jobs.  A second
interpretation is that the families remaining in zip codes are the more steady/reliable/better
treated workers, and thus tend to work longer hours.  The average wage level also plays a key
role in hours worked.  Scenario 12 shows the effect raising the median retail sales wage from
$6.00 per hour to $7.75 per hour.  This $1.75 per hour increases is associated with an additional
9 to 18 hours of work per week.24
6.  Conclusions
In this paper, we provide a preliminary assessment of the impacts of the child care market
and the availability of subsidized child care and education on the probability of work and hours
of work of current and former welfare recipients.  We find that both the child care market and
availability of subsidized care and education impacts the probability of work more than it
impacts hours of work.
Building upon previous work that mainly considers the impact of child care costs on the
probability of work, we assess the impact of the cost of care, but are careful to include measures
of the quality and availability of care.  Child care is a heterogeneous and location specific
product. Thus, full assessment of its impact requires incorporation of what has been called the
“child care trilogy” - availability, cost and quality.  As has been found in previous work, we find
that increases in the costs of child care significantly decreases the probability that women with
children will work.  However, we find that the stability and quality of child care have much
larger effects on the probability of work than does cost.  Our results are for low-income women.
It would be useful to assess the impacts of the quality and stability for more general population
groups.
Previous work on the impact of child care subsidies and early childhood education have
generally consider a single program (e.g., Head Start).  The world of early care and education is
complex.  Public schools and other entities provide pre-kindergarten programs, Head Start
provides comprehensive services for poor children and their families and the federal government
and state governments jointly fund child care subsidy programs for the low-income families.  In
this paper, we have tried to assess a broader array of child care subsidy and early education
programs.  Like previous work, we find that increased funding for child care subsidies is
associated with increased probabilities that current and former welfare recipients will work.  We
also find that current and former welfare recipients living in areas with full-day kindergartens are
more likely to work than recipients living in areas with part-day or no kindergarten.  The
availability of (typically) part-day, part-year Head Start and Pre-K programs is associated with a
decreased probability that the current and former recipients in our sample will work and a
concomitant increase in the probability that they will be involved in training and education,
which is more compatible with a part-day, part-year schedule.25
We hope that our work will stimulate further efforts to assess the impacts of aspects of
child care markets in addition to costs.  The quality and costs of child care are interrelated and
assessment of one in the absence of the other may lead to biased results.  We also hope that our
work will stimulate others studying low-income families to consider the effect the broad array of
child care subsidies and early education programs available has not only on the probability that
low-income women will work, but also on the well-being of low-income children.26
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Hourly Wage Client's hourly wage last month.
Hours Worked Hours per week the client worked last month.
Working Client worked 1 or more hours last month.




Characteristics of Adult Child Care Voucher Clients who are also Current or Former TAFDC Recipients
Sex Binary=1 if the client is female.
Marital Status Binary=1 if married at time of DTA entry.
Language Binary=1 if the family language is English.
Race Binaries for race (Black, Hispanic, or other).
Age Age of the client (and age squared).
Education Binaries for client’s highest level of education.
Number of Dependents Client’s number of dependents.
Age of Youngest Child Age of the client’s youngest child.
DTA Monthly Files
Characteristics of Formal Child Care
 Availability Full-time capacity in family day care and in group
care per 100 kids in age group in township. 1996 Licensing Lists; CB
Percent of slots in NAEYC accredited centers. Quality




Median and inter-quartile range of weekly prices
for full-time center care in town for age of
youngest child.
1994 MA Market Rate
Survey and 1997 Resource
and Referral data bases
Policy & Administrative Variables Related to the Child Care Voucher System
State and fed. subsidy funding per eligible child. OCCS budget allocation
Monthly AFDC cases per 1000 pop. in zip code. DTA, US Census
Yearly number of reported child neglect/abuse




State / Federal Child
Care Subsidies
Proportion of children eligible for free or reduced
lunch in elementary school district.
MA Department of
Education
Reimbursement Rates Median and IQR of state full-time daily child care
reimbursement rate in zip code.
OCCS Monthly Billing
Files




Policy & Administrative Variables Related to Early Childhood Education Programs
Head Start
Binary=1 if there is a Head Start program in town
and it is in operation. Binary=1 if a Community
Action Committee runs the program.






Town’s Community Partnership for Children
budget per eligible 3 and 4 year old kids. DOE, 1990 Census
Binary=1 if public elementary school offers free
full-day kindergarten.













Binary=1 if the youngest child is age-eligible for
first grade or higher on 9/1/96 (=0 in summer).
Binary=1 if the youngest child is age-eligible for
kindergarten on 9/1/96 (=0 in summer months)
Binary=1 if the youngest child is age-eligible for
pre-school on 9/1/96 (=0 in summer months).
DTA monthly files; DOE
Early Childhood
Education Eligibility
Binary=1 if the youngest child is age eligible for
Head Start on 9/1/96 (=0 when Head Start is not
in session).
DTA monthly files; PIR









Binary=1 after November 30, 1996. DTA
Binary=1 if local welfare office is consolidated. Welfare Office
Binaries for welfare offices.
DTA
EITC Income at which phase out of EITC begins. 1996 & 1997 Tax Code
(IRS)
Binary=1 if located in zip code of a federally





Community Centers Employer Tax Credits
Dollars per worker for “Certified Projects” in
township authorized by MA Office of Business
Development.
MA Office of Business
and Development
Medical Insurance Binary=1 if the client had access to medical
insurance at time of DTA entry. DTA Monthly Files
Binary=1 if the youngest child is under 2 (time
limit & work exempt). Child’s Age Effect of
Time Limits & the
Work Requirement Binary=1 if the youngest child is between 2 and 5
years old (work exempt, subject to time limits).
DTA Monthly Files
Costs of Working
1 and 5 year housing turnover rate in zip code Availability of
Informal Care Proportion of the zip code’s population aged 5 or
older living in the county for 5 years or more.
1990 Census
Average commute time to work.
Public transportation is available in the zip code. Transportation Costs
Proportion of workers using public transportation.
1990 Census
MSA 1997 median child care worker wage. 1997 BLS Occupational
Employ. & Wage Survey Costs of Child Care







Local Labor Market Conditions
Proportion of local jobs in the service sector.
Proportion of local jobs in the trades sector. 1996 & 1997 ES202 Data Availability of Low-
Skill Jobs
Monthly township employment growth rate. LAUS Statistics (BLS)
Wages of Low-Skill
Jobs MSA 1997 median retail sales and cashier wages. 1997 BLS OEWS
Working Hours Proportion of workers who leave for work
between 4:00pm and midnight. 1990 Census
Information MA Division of Employment & Training operates




Est. 1997 median household income in zip code.
Estimated 1997 proportion Black in zip code.
Estimated 1997 proportion Hispanic in zip code.
1997 Geolytics
Proportion foreign born in zip code. 1990 Census
Drug crimes per 100,000 people in township.
Part I offenses per 100,000 people in township.
Proportion offenses cleared by arrest in township.









Table A2.  Summary Statistics of Entire Sample (N=81,397).
Mean Median Min Max
Dependent Variables
Hourly wage if greater than $0 (N=40,426; i,m) 7.37 7.21 2 50
Hours worked last week if greater than 0 (N=49,131; i,m) 31.8 35 1 60
Worked positive hours last week (i,m) 0.604 1 0 1
Adult Characteristics
Female (i) 0.943 1 0 1
Married (i) 0.050 0 0 1
Household primary language is English (i) 0.936 1 0 1
Black (i) 0.339 0 0 1
Hispanic (i) 0.401 0 0 1
White (i) 0.245 0 0 1
Other race (i) 0.016 0 0 1
Age of adult recipient  (i,m) 28.0 27 14 55
No high school degree (i) 0.379 0 0 1
High school degree or GED (i) 0.472 0 0 1
Some college, no degree (i) 0.116 0 0 1
College degree (i) 0.033 0 0 1
Number of dependents (i,m) 2.67 2 1 11
Age of youngest child  (i,m) 3.13 3 0 13
Characteristics of Formal Care
Family child care capacity per 100 kids 0 to 11 (t) 5.8 6.0 0 17.2
Group child care capacity per 100 kids in age group (i,t) 13.8 4.7 0 89.5
1996 proportion of GDC slots NAEYC accredited (i,t) 0.176 0.164 0 1
Median days fmly providers have been in operation (m,t) 1852 1874 0 2941
IQR days family providers have been in operation (m,t) 2251 2178 0 3569
Median days grp providers have been in operation (i,m,t) 4326 3461 0 17409
IQR days group providers have been in operation (i,m,t) 5493 4330 0 16892
Median weekly cost of age-specific care (i,t) 113.66 103.75 80 247.50
IQR weekly cost of age-specific care (i,t) 34.43 30.00 0 110.00
The Child Care Voucher System
State and federal child care subsidy per poor child (y) 447 434 434 511
Active AFDC cases per 1,000 people in zip code (q,z) 29.6 27.1 0 590.2
Child neglect/abuse cases per 1,000 kids in zip code (t,y) 72.6 77.9 2.8 139.9
Propprtn of children receive free or reduced lunch (sd,y) 0.540 0.647 0.004 0.757
Median state daily reimbursement rate in zip code (z) 25.00 25.82 8.13 42.50
IQR state daily reimbursement rate in zip code (z) 9.94 10 0 27
CCRA is Child Care Choices of Boston (i,m) 0.329 0 0 1
CCRA is Child Care Resource Center (i,m) 0.082 0 0 1
CCRA is Child Care Search (i,m) 0.138 0 0 1
CCRA is Child Care Works (i,m) 0.187 0 0 1
CCRA is New England Farm Workers Council (i,m) 0.264 0 0 1
Early Childhood Education Programs
Head Start program in town and in session (m,t) 0.276 0 0 1
Head Start open & run by Comm. Action Agency (m,t) 0.642 1 0 1
Head Start in session & run by Non -CAA (m,t) 0.358 0 0 1
CPC dollars per poor 3 & 4 year olds (fy,t) 694 449 0 12159
Public school distrct offers free full-day kindergarten (sd) 0.776 1 0 1
Proportion of 5 year olds attending kindergarten (sd) 0.889 0.901 0.529 131
Mean Median Min Max
Proportion of 4 year olds attending pre-kindergarten (sd) 0.159 0.167 0 1
Youngest child is elementary school eligible (i,m) 0.067 0 0 1
Youngest child is kindergarten eligible (i,m) 0.039 0 0 1
Youngest child is pre-k eligible (i,m) 0.074 0 0 1
Youngest child is head start eligible (i,m) 0.098 0 0 1
Other Policy & Administrative Variables
Min. wage increase & WOTC begins Oct. 1, 1996 (i,m) 0.842 1 0 1
MA welfare time limits imposed Dec. 1, 1996 (i,m) 0.710 1 0 1
Local welfare office is consolidated (wo) 0.494 0 0 1
Income at which EITC begins phase out (y) 11844 11950 11650 11950
Lives in US empwrmnt zone or enhanced community (z) 0.368 0 0 1
Dollars per worker from MOBD certified projects (m,t) 218.07 4.50 0 8863
Client had access to medical insurance at DTA entry (i) 0.051 0 0 1
Client's youngest child is under 2 years old (i,m) 0.260 0 0 1
Client's youngest child is between 2 and 5 years old (i,m) 0.595 1 0 1
Client's youngest child is over 5 years old (i,m) 0.145 0 0 1
Costs of Working
1 Year household moving rate (z) 0.187 0.189 0.034 0.443
5 Year household moving rate (z) 0.443 0.434 0.196 0.847
5 Year inter-county moving rate (z) 0.164 0.151 0.018 0.775
Average minutes to work (z) 24.3 22.2 15.9 35.0
Public transportation is available (z) 0.935 1 0 1
Proportion workers using public transportation (z) 0.144 0.060 0 0.433
Median child care worker wage (msa) 8.10 8.00 7.01 9.81
40
th
 percentile fair market rent for 2 bedroom apt. (msa,y) 726 683 552 839
Local Labor Market Conditions
Proportion of local jobs in the service sector (t,y) 0.345 0.366 0.019 0.657
Proportion of local jobs in the trade sector (t,y) 0.198 0.194 0.038 0.600
Monthly township employment growth rate x 100 (m,t) -0.011 0.002 -0.349 0.273
Median retail sales wage (msa) 7.44 7.27 5.96 7.87
Median cashiers wage (msa) 6.67 6.58 6.20 7.00
Prop. of workers leave for work b/w 4pm & midnight (z) 0.075 0.076 0 0.126
MA Div. of Employ. & Train. has a job center in town (t) 0.524 1 0 1
Community Characteristics
Median household income in zip code 36963 33881 16028 112321
Proportion population Black 0.231 0.070 0 0.955
Proportion population Hispanic 0.135 0.103 0 0.804
Proportion population foreign born 0.147 0.148 0.012 0.670
Drug crimes per 100,000 in township (t,y) 2143 1166 0 5797
Part I offenses per 100,000 in township (t,y) 4057 1704 3 26570
Proportion Part I offenses cleared by arrest (t,y) 0.202 0.210 0 0.968
Parenthetical abbreviations are included to indicate variation over “unit of analysis” and “time”.  The
abbreviations are as follows.  Units of analysis: (i) individual client, (msa) Metropolitan Statistical Area,
(sd) school district, (t) township, (wo) welfare office, and (z) zip code.  Time variation: (fy) MA fiscal
year, (m) month, (q) quarter, and (y) calendar year.  Head start variables vary by township and within
Boston according to the Boston neighborhoods as defined by the Boston Redevelopment Authority.32
Table A3.  Frequency of Geographic Variables.
Boston Neighborhoods
Allston-Brighton 749 Jamaica Plain 955 South Boston 865
Central Boston 724 Mattapan 1736 South Dorcester 9432
Charlestown 728 North Dorcester 1971 South End 1085
East Boston 1344 Roslindale 966 Other 251
Hyde Park 1020 Roxbury 4048 Not in Boston 55523
Metropolitan Statistical Areas
Boston 39883 New Bedford 7112 Springfield 21482
Lowell 6267 Providence-Fall River 5839 Other 561
None 253
Welfare Office
Bowdoin Park 11403 Malden 68 Springfield Liberty St. 16446
Brockton 77 Milford 159 Springfield State St. 71
Davis Square 4238 New Bedford 7029 Taunton 2121
Fall River 5969 New Market Square 7836 Waltham 858
Falmouth 91 North Shore 56 Wareham 568
Framingham 3100 Quincy 115 Westfield 2180
Holyoke 2785 Revere 4108 Woburn 770
Lowell 6457 Roslindale 4745 Other 147
Townships
Acton 63 Holliston 88 Somerset 123
Acushnet 242 Holyoke 2781 Somerville 1192
Agawam 253 Hopkinton 50 Southwick 85
Arlington 158 Hudson 155 Springfield 14052
Ashland 133 Lexington 75 Sudbury 131
Belmont 52 Littleton 75 Swansea 79
Billerica 296 Lowell 4968 Taunton 1140
Boston 25874 Ludlow 159 Tewksbury 244
Bourne 91 Mansfield 305 Tyngsborough 81
Brockton 50 Marion 68 Waltham 777
Brookline 182 Marlborough 555 Wareham 568
Burlington 188 Maynard 156 Watertown 182
Cambridge 1503 Middleborough 157 West Springfield 919
Chelmsford 251 Monson 79 Westborough 61
Chelsea 1618 Natick 138 Westfield 840
Chicopee 1827 Needham 101 Westport 119
Dartmouth 529 New Bedford 5945 Wilbraham 55
Dracut 380 Newton 423 Wilmington 76
Fairhaven 167 Norton 220 Winthrop 197
Fall River 5565 Palmer 267 Woburn 474
Framingham 1516 Raynham 142 Other 1125
Freetown 83 Revere 94933
Table A4.  Estimation Results -- Probability of Working.






Full Reduced Full Reduced Full Reduced
Female 0.050347 0.074951 0.090544 0.065707
0.108135 0.043460 0.105364 0.042649
Married -0.025579 0.022684
0.116396 0.113524
English 0.300856 0.299111 0.301666 0.300741
0.041100 0.040997 0.040872 0.040648
Black 0.112643 0.115302 0.106398 0.112175
0.030175 0.029887 0.029474 0.028754
Hispanic 0.122466 0.121103 0.130401 0.139839
0.030560 0.030615 0.029664 0.029029
Other race -0.098301 -0.090444 -0.091479
0.083929 0.083348 0.083186
Age 0.208876 0.208000 0.199350 0.198122 0.054147 0.053931
0.011316 0.011254 0.010950 0.010894 0.011031 0.011007
Age Squared -0.003109 -0.003094 -0.002978 -0.002957 -0.000913 -0.000912
0.000185 0.000184 0.000180 0.000179 0.000186 0.000186
No high school deg -0.262636 -0.262761 -0.263303 -0.265510
0.021880 0.021757 0.021363 0.021036
Some college -0.088491 -0.092344 -0.094634 -0.101197
0.034791 0.034712 0.033829 0.033534
College degree 0.075317 0.070555 0.063524
0.062956 0.061924 0.061622
Number of dpndnts -0.019341 -0.020005 -0.017712 -0.017472
0.011094 0.011053 0.010903 0.010855
Age youngest child 0.044377 0.042311 0.050220 0.049679 0.004660 0.004607
0.008328 0.006946 0.007835 0.006385 0.002706 0.002689
Family cc capacity -0.060491 -0.094397 -0.013433 -0.008746
0.057134 0.053544 0.016121 0.005246
Group cc capacity -0.000470 -0.000162 -0.000248 -0.000235
0.000621 0.000589 0.000163 0.000159
GDC slots accredtd 0.169343 0.145636 0.138007 0.154638 0.077036 0.061430
0.094726 0.080102 0.091120 0.078114 0.023467 0.020925
Med days (family) 0.000738 0.000602 0.000388 0.000320 0.000373 0.000381
0.000088 0.000073 0.000092 0.000058 0.000028 0.000024
IQR days (family) -0.000554 -0.000414 -0.000350 -0.000204 -0.000239 -0.000155
0.000199 0.000104 0.000201 0.000077 0.000059 0.000029
Med days (group) -0.000002 0.000000 -0.000001 -0.000001
0.000004 0.000004 0.000001 0.000001
IQR days (group) -0.000012 -0.000010 -0.000009 -0.000009 -0.000005 -0.000005
0.000003 0.000002 0.000003 0.000002 0.000001 0.000001
Med weekly cost -0.002122 -0.002148 -0.001608 -0.000587 -0.000671
0.001186 0.001168 0.000811 0.000288 0.000258
IQR weekly cost -0.000838 -0.001974 -0.001569 -0.002555 -0.000214 -0.000550






Full Reduced Full Reduced Full Reduced
Subsidy per child 0.001426 0.001731 0.001613 0.001630 0.000492 0.000515
0.000248 0.000161 0.000230 0.000139 0.000077 0.000052
AFDC per 1,000 -0.000298 -0.000334 -0.000161
0.000695 0.000647 0.000222
Neglect per 1,000 0.001834 -0.002083 0.002781 0.000785 0.000800
0.002025 0.001638 0.001977 0.000478 0.000411
Free lunch 0.386122 0.696708 -0.029839 0.490415 0.273782
1.204068 0.328138 1.138018 0.383945 0.108928
Reimburse Rate -0.036260 -0.014102 -0.036170 -0.010867
0.018613 0.011882 0.017337 0.004523
IQR Reimb. Rate 0.000914 0.006176 -0.000554
0.011599 0.010305 0.002833
CCRC 0.028664 0.013424 0.022651
0.063114 0.061684 0.063385
CC Search 0.035667 0.067201 0.010055
0.060465 0.051529 0.060352
Child Care Works -0.004303 -0.001505
0.062737 0.063070
NEFWC 0.114545 0.111597 0.078911 0.069390
0.051211 0.047293 0.050318 0.044960
Head Start avail. -0.080177 -0.075164 -0.093046 -0.106947 -0.027990 -0.022202
0.025229 0.017575 0.025163 0.017760 0.006903 0.004760
CAA Head Start 0.009872 -0.018413 0.007042
0.027299 0.027352 0.007464
CPC dollars 0.000020 -0.000004 0.000002
0.000026 0.000025 0.000007
Full-day Kind. 0.081690 0.318729 0.028461 0.102977 -0.056750
0.289019 0.093731 0.333543 0.070586 0.085038
Prop in Kind. -0.850357 -0.690892 -0.834226 -0.358289 -0.407429
1.138036 0.322062 1.187728 0.208066 0.328476
Prop. in Pre-K -1.441267 -0.593300 -1.254400 -0.583661 -0.316564 -0.359210
0.645377 0.237992 0.641039 0.152066 0.237881 0.100303
Elem. School elig. 0.061690 0.058456 0.045086 0.039874 0.020766 0.020010
0.023394 0.023320 0.024439 0.024431 0.006724 0.006697
Kindergarten elig. -0.083288 -0.084115 -0.103202 -0.106742 -0.028825 -0.029770
0.029836 0.029654 0.030896 0.030844 0.008499 0.008451
Pre-K eligible -0.004927 -0.038671 -0.040063 0.003342
0.023673 0.024258 0.024116 0.006671
Head start eligible 0.064407 0.057618 0.077978 0.069345 0.017905 0.018597
0.026216 0.025351 0.029134 0.029081 0.006989 0.006801
After Oct. 1, 1996 -0.053029 -0.041116 -0.080440 -0.075762 -0.016301 -0.016343
0.014112 0.013446 0.013398 0.013250 0.004510 0.004318
After Dec. 1, 1996 -0.032066 -0.028032 -0.028053 -0.013089 -0.013178
0.012425 0.013301 0.012031 0.004774 0.004730
Wel off consolidtd -0.577126 -0.485879 -0.325357 -0.108370 -0.247181 -0.203311






Full Reduced Full Reduced Full Reduced
EITC phase out 0.000143 0.000117 0.000053 0.000053
0.000126 0.000126 0.000032 0.000030
Empowermnt zone -0.038988 -0.063460 -0.004984 0.028231
0.080089 0.074098 0.019845 0.014685
EDIP $ per worker 0.000024 0.000025 0.000020 0.000007 0.000006
0.000022 0.000023 0.000023 0.000005 0.000005
Insurance 0.103275 0.098397 0.111152 0.106349
0.048796 0.048471 0.048297 0.047682
Yngst child < 2 -0.095745 -0.105486 -0.096106 -0.106369 -0.035939 -0.034566
0.062260 0.052278 0.056793 0.046886 0.016248 0.015991
Yngst child 2 to 5 -0.016104 -0.022833 0.001522 -0.005075 -0.011007 -0.009038
0.047521 0.037897 0.043729 0.034271 0.012896 0.012744
1-Year moving rate 1.545806 1.903360 0.714580 0.799454 0.542027
1.300128 0.888747 1.192783 0.324726 0.253264
5-Year moving rate -2.692062 -1.841266 -1.885399 -0.721120 -1.299635 -1.101832
0.841056 0.647516 0.755601 0.304081 0.203691 0.169181
5-Year county rate 2.164095 0.890302 1.634311 0.333179 1.023626 0.926752
0.650809 0.358031 0.589358 0.251628 0.169056 0.129065
Minutes to work 0.055320 0.034385 0.045144 0.007268 0.024103 0.015372
0.016149 0.009631 0.014721 0.006627 0.004180 0.002806
Prop public trnspt -2.407347 -1.865140 -1.206146 -0.301812 -1.297655 -1.152550
1.043587 0.468314 0.927689 0.262427 0.233361 0.154107
Public transp avail. -0.008009 0.018937 0.000746 -0.040232
0.178662 0.153575 0.042281 0.025751
CC worker wage 0.073846 0.541441 0.193132 0.323675 0.021674 -0.147321
0.504262 0.184105 0.450787 0.164471 0.168560 0.065023
Fair Market Rent -0.001463 0.001959 -0.000714 -0.000634 -0.000791
0.001456 0.000573 0.001439 0.000341 0.000292
Prop. Service Jobs -2.300602 -1.812028 -2.721544 -1.026547 -0.838526 -0.680177
0.957823 0.475225 1.011249 0.350619 0.208551 0.126330
Prop. Trade Jobs 0.207033 0.115484 0.198852 0.233759
0.729484 0.752223 0.186170 0.127611
Emply grw rt x 100 0.106424 0.111045 0.205585 0.225005 0.021659
0.070684 0.067137 0.063354 0.057852 0.020355
Median retail wage 0.424383 0.298190 0.285545 0.249715
0.487754 0.453192 0.208625 0.121071
Med cashier wage -2.143227 -1.790461 -1.726002 -0.438713 -0.941632
1.973264 0.347996 1.699191 0.279295 0.768509
Prop. Night shift -1.546410 -0.083613 -1.034182 -1.126979
2.005610 1.820466 0.485830 0.374763
Job center in town 0.018608 0.152978 0.088245 -0.016222 -0.099560
0.335852 0.336810 0.053412 0.102175 0.029812
Median income 0.000002 0.000006 0.000000 -0.000005 0.000001 -0.000002
0.000006 0.000003 0.000005 0.000002 0.000001 0.000001
Prop. Pop Black -0.009301 -0.107117 -0.283732 0.012002 -0.086892






Full Reduced Full Reduced Full Reduced
Prop pop Hispanic 0.281612 0.279395 0.141508 0.198132 0.142049
0.200259 0.154112 0.186880 0.052148 0.041689
Prop pop foreign 1.276517 1.163230 1.024200 0.452554 0.594573 0.384097
0.506356 0.392442 0.443909 0.258356 0.113204 0.091618
Drug crms/100000 0.000028 -0.000198 0.000229 -0.000014
0.000142 0.000098 0.000132 0.000030
Part I offs/ 100000 0.000018 0.000096 -0.000149 -0.000023 0.000026 0.000020
0.000096 0.000064 0.000089 0.000005 0.000020 0.000006
Prop arrested 0.792911 0.478184 1.258819 0.300635 0.227891 0.254471
0.497333 0.280783 0.439786 0.188189 0.096745 0.05783337
Table A5.  Estimation Results -- Weekly Hours Worked.






Full Reduced Full Reduced Full Reduced
Female -1.581643 -1.509915 -1.671086 -1.588862
0.968193 0.954586 0.963112 0.942249
Married -2.472879 -2.407728 -2.421232 -2.354429
1.051625 1.038134 1.045493 1.025271
English -0.838413 -0.781448 -0.774753 -0.704117
0.438896 0.434861 0.433515 0.431031
Black 0.056680 0.164598 -0.047908 0.062053
0.296674 0.291219 0.286448 0.279760
Hispanic -0.756775 -0.708269 -0.800480 -0.701828
0.297724 0.290936 0.286857 0.280469
Other race 1.301868 1.422788 1.187087 1.349728
0.789998 0.786487 0.782129 0.780236
Age 0.786590 0.768437 0.784257 0.766533 0.339934 0.266589
0.110082 0.106758 0.106887 0.102919 0.259180 0.258469
Age Squared -0.011730 -0.011385 -0.011666 -0.011392 -0.006412 -0.005694
0.001758 0.001713 0.001701 0.001649 0.004259 0.004251
No high school deg -0.390895 -0.342829 -0.391860 -0.389807
0.211120 0.201844 0.207258 0.203622
Some college -0.219353 -0.340947 -0.346491
0.326020 0.319992 0.316773
College degree -0.016107 -0.080366
0.560844 0.540971
Number of dpndnts -0.003319 -0.023173
0.105824 0.102538
Age youngest child 0.050947 0.016421 0.013260 -0.012805 0.035961 0.004991
0.078222 0.061384 0.070780 0.056479 0.057945 0.051411
Family cc capacity 0.493114 0.514661 0.221290 0.891153 0.290763
0.542476 0.423331 0.108152 0.452510 0.111363
Group cc capacity -0.003607 -0.004850 -0.003259
0.005257 0.004874 0.003545
GDC slots accredtd 1.051402 1.094580 0.440737 1.271128 1.296662
0.796415 0.801912 0.775032 0.548429 0.503259
Med days (family) 0.001825 0.000853 0.000666 0.000653 0.002629 0.003080
0.000664 0.000458 0.000657 0.000519 0.000629 0.000518
IQR days (family) -0.002941 -0.002253 -0.003056 -0.001985 -0.001996 -0.003241
0.001700 0.000703 0.001422 0.000587 0.001304 0.000673
Med days (group) 0.000048 0.000048 0.000033 0.000058 0.000055
0.000033 0.000030 0.000031 0.000022 0.000021
IQR days (group) 0.000031 0.000034 0.000033 0.000036 0.000029 0.000035
0.000022 0.000021 0.000021 0.000019 0.000014 0.000014
Med weekly cost 0.006447 -0.007006 0.009777 0.009052
0.009987 0.010157 0.006825 0.005995
IQR weekly cost -0.011105 -0.014597 -0.008658 -0.009861 -0.012678






Full Reduced Full Reduced Full Reduced
Subsidy per child 0.003581 0.005272 0.002789 0.003425 0.003702 0.003159
0.001724 0.001113 0.001602 0.001012 0.001647 0.001114
AFDC per 1,000 -0.003595 -0.000689 -0.004177
0.005928 0.005175 0.005862
Neglect per 1,000 0.023027 0.017433 0.014758 0.015703 0.019537 0.031085
0.016222 0.007846 0.017151 0.007773 0.010676 0.006859
Free lunch 3.660652 3.558170 18.46655 5.770123
11.45961 9.959771 10.56867 2.159539
Reimburse Rate -0.426806 -0.119805 -0.249242 -0.641694 -0.607127
0.170946 0.075896 0.147880 0.119377 0.076134
IQR Reimb. Rate -0.082540 -0.051263 0.004475 -0.194711 -0.194407
0.108732 0.048669 0.091844 0.075840 0.049030
CCRC -0.491956 -0.493985 5.631905 6.433372
0.609424 0.544640 1.673174 1.653034
CC Search -0.278395 -0.110325
0.550880 0.510678
Child Care Works 0.574564 1.003836 0.655644 0.721856
0.594819 0.495361 0.538632 0.447181
NEFWC -0.487025 -0.552007 -0.431958
0.517375 0.469753 0.427776
Head Start avail. -0.203118 -0.150721 -0.152827 -0.148920 -0.095375
0.177760 0.182786 0.109445 0.150804 0.088096
CAA Head Start 0.152441 0.022446 0.143065
0.184898 0.192456 0.159723
CPC dollars -0.000021 0.000078 0.000003
0.000177 0.000172 0.000156
Full-day Kind. 2.048697 0.505767 -1.145526 1.223221
1.885455 1.905998 0.524616 2.031964
Prop in Kind. 27.07579 11.38811 16.19529 1.913613 44.00852 35.16504
9.935551 2.882712 7.644284 1.491994 8.023330 3.304201
Prop. in Pre-K -5.022579 -5.368868 -12.54762 -9.697861
4.217680 3.647372 5.465032 2.194336
Elem. School elig. 0.230403 0.192097 0.235033 0.233467 0.208009 0.233514
0.144521 0.141166 0.143436 0.141351 0.130610 0.127843
Kindergarten elig. 0.097432 0.328887 0.289722 0.015611
0.217067 0.222314 0.225792 0.172995
Pre-K eligible 0.121738 0.010059 0.198869 0.150764
0.171502 0.175613 0.139278 0.133683
Head start eligible -0.093477 -0.052539 -0.135372
0.194913 0.207529 0.152052
After Oct. 1, 1996 -0.282752 -0.230695 -0.480621 -0.488191 -0.256210 -0.312942
0.116634 0.118353 0.116978 0.113664 0.100425 0.093694
After Dec. 1, 1996 -0.070555 -0.052447 -0.102786
0.106723 0.102686 0.107689
Wel off consolidtd -10.73763 -13.30122 -14.19980 -3.617037






Full Reduced Full Reduced Full Reduced
EITC phase out -0.001041 -0.000444 -0.000430 -0.001091 -0.001551
0.001001 0.001018 0.000361 0.000719 0.000636
Empowermnt zone 0.117060 -0.084143 0.757592
0.755558 0.690508 0.545106
EDIP $ per worker -0.000010 0.000021 -0.000020
0.000097 0.000102 0.000098
Insurance 1.061114 1.060033 1.126935 1.121419
0.440454 0.434970 0.434053 0.430082
Yngst child < 2 0.708950 0.488088 0.448483 0.402535 0.703050 0.546831
0.547868 0.319612 0.486622 0.262899 0.353603 0.252040
Yngst child 2 to 5 0.857431 0.679291 0.808775 0.741342 0.712098 0.572952
0.441888 0.266083 0.371785 0.212259 0.276228 0.201631
1-Year moving rate 51.24700 33.43823 32.88924 12.07181 70.45807 65.71499
13.40731 6.888595 11.05666 2.854875 8.483324 6.128118
5-Year moving rate -24.32216 -13.00190 -11.58317 -36.39176 -31.09048
8.673991 4.555725 7.047657 5.450900 4.138865
5-Year county rate 9.935410 5.074339 16.73292 6.910155
6.653653 5.384512 4.517729 2.665405
Minutes to work 0.467677 0.300717 0.618358 0.415346
0.169620 0.127702 0.119094 0.064057
Prop public trnspt -22.43944 -5.446984 -9.696213 -41.81263 -34.83593
11.87490 2.642578 9.000542 7.098041 3.933344
Public transp avail. 1.204925 0.467797 2.455492 1.839208
1.751009 1.284095 1.167269 0.635269
CC worker wage 7.827717 11.11935 2.322033 8.827615 3.353602
4.613019 3.579582 0.940724 5.295719 1.554015
Fair Market Rent 0.011373 0.001231 0.014150 0.011766
0.012141 0.012199 0.007522 0.006245
Prop. Service Jobs 0.149578 9.728035 6.102355 8.301001 -3.328043
6.174583 2.283090 6.445949 2.208860 4.709786
Prop. Trade Jobs -3.596348 -7.288823 -3.690498 -2.823532
6.161364 5.572782 2.091705 4.212306
Emply grw rt x 100 0.755718 0.782855 1.043982 0.915818 0.844242 0.974812
0.507917 0.427096 0.473928 0.430223 0.442336 0.387759
Median retail wage 8.779058 7.910154 10.56256 5.198102 19.60895 10.10830
3.927513 1.527240 3.365205 2.722752 7.463216 5.544237
Med cashier wage -41.36241 -48.13223 -2.300796 -43.41467 -27.05564
18.63031 14.57958 2.004658 26.76219 11.92389
Prop. Night shift 41.09627 14.52749 43.13362 24.36659 41.74361 44.76476
18.78776 9.736644 15.91000 8.362194 13.24959 9.713502
Job center in town 4.683650 5.565377 4.393240 3.539003
3.311781 2.726543 2.733391 0.594286
Median income 0.000094 0.000078 0.000092 0.000045
0.000056 0.000047 0.000038 0.000024
Prop. Pop Black -0.953864 -1.602829 -1.087295 -1.496634 -1.016672






Full Reduced Full Reduced Full Reduced
Prop pop Hispanic 2.172814 0.697203 2.604092 1.993908
2.074513 1.792814 1.428141 1.106390
Prop pop foreign 6.846938 3.946279 9.759000 13.97995
4.701409 4.040600 3.331334 2.413531
Drug crms/100000 -0.000161 0.000362 -0.000312
0.001245 0.001171 0.000666
Part I offs/ 100000 0.000109 -0.000212 0.000151
0.000824 0.000792 0.000448
Prop arrested 0.621539 0.992840 0.243641
3.680771 3.848493 2.131959